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Abstract 
Offshore banking is a significant aspect of the financial environment in some Caribbean Islands. The 
objective of this paper is to identify whether domestic banks located in Caribbean offshore centers operate 
any differently from domestic banks located in islands that do not host offshore banking. Balance sheets 
and income statements between 1993 and 2004 are used to measure the level of competitiveness and 
efficiency of banking activity. The results show that domestic banks located in Caribbean offshore 
financial centers operate in a less competitive manner and are less efficient in their role in providing 
financial intermediation than local commercial banks located in non-offshore banking islands. 
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1. Introduction 
 Offshore financial centers (OFCs) 
have received increased attention in recent 
years for opposing reasons. The current 
global recession has motivated some 
regulators and international authorities to 
attribute part blame for the financial crisis 
on OFCs.  The criticism is that low 
regulatory standards in some OFCs 
undermine the effectiveness of regulation in 
major onshore financial jurisdictions. On the 
other hand central planners of some 
developing countries embrace offshore 
banking as a strategy to increase government 
revenue, create employment, and gain 
access to international capital markets. 
  This paper addresses related issues 
by comparing the business activity of local 
financial institutions located in Caribbean 
offshore financial centers (OFCs) to that of 
financial institutions located in non-OFC 
Caribbean islands.  There is little 
documented research on offshore banking 
and its’ impact on the local economy, and in 
particular, the impact on local finance. Rose 
and Spiegel (2006) argue that close 
proximity to offshore banking influences 
local financial markets by increasing the 
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extent of financial competition. The exercise 
undertaken by Rose and Spiegel (2006) is 
different from that done in this study in two 
aspects. Rose and Spiegel uses a sample of 
40 OFCs and uses market concentration 
ratios and the interest rate spread to proxy 
for measures of banking competitiveness. 
This study accounts for differences between 
offshore financial centers, by using a 
homogenous sample of OFCs, and further 
empirically estimates a measure of market 
competitiveness known as the H-statistic. 
This study finds that offshore banking is not 
associated with increased competitiveness of 
local banks but that local banks located in 
OFC islands behave less competitively. 
 A brief description of offshore 
banking in the Caribbean is given in section 
2. The following sections then describe the 
data used, and the two methodologies 
employed in the analysis. Section 7 gives 
some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Overview of Offshore Banking in the  
    Caribbean 
Offshore banking is a form of 
international banking in which banks 
incorporate or reside in the host country but 
conduct business with non-residents in 
foreign currency markets. The establishment 
of an offshore banking jurisdiction is a form 
of regulatory competition in an effort to 
“encourage the development as a 
responsible off-shore center by providing 
incentives by way of tax reduction” and “to 
enable citizens to share in the ownership, 
management and rewards of any business 
resulting from there from”1.   
There are three groups of OFCs, 
primary financial centers, secondary 
financial centers (or regional financial 
centers), and booking centers. London, New 
York and Japan are the primary financial 
                                                 
1
 Statement of purpose Barbados Offshore Banking 
Act. 
centers of the world as they act as the hub of 
international banking across the globe. 
Regional centers can be divided into two 
groups, funding centers and collection 
centers. Offshore banks of funding centers 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Panama 
are net importers capital and are the primary 
source of funds to their local economy. 
Collection centers include countries such as 
Bahrain that generate excess savings for 
export.   
OFCs of the Caribbean fall into the 
group of financial centers, called the 
booking center, in which offshore banks do 
not conduct banking business with the local 
economy.
2
 The term booking center also 
refers to the practice that the banking 
products and services provided by offshore 
banks do not originate from the host 
country, but that the offshore banks in the 
Caribbean act as an intermediary between 
customers and financial services providers 
located in other regions. These services 
include the acceptance of deposits, the 
issuance of credit, the provisions of various 
investment products, business planning and 
structuring to achieve the best after tax 
returns.  
The difference between Caribbean 
offshore banking and other non-booking 
offshore financial centers can be seen when 
comparing the international debt securities 
issued by residency to that issued by 
nationality within any one country.
3
 For 
example, resident financial institutions of 
The Cayman Islands issued US$295 billion 
worth of debt securities in 2000, as opposed 
to US$14 billion debt securities issued by 
nationals. Similarly in The Bahamas, 
US$3.64 billion were issued by residents, 
                                                 
2 See Errico and Musalem (1999) for a more detailed 
description of the forms of offshore financial centers. 
3 This data is obtained from the Bank of International 
Settlements Quarterly Review, September 2009. Residency 
refers to the country in which the issuer is incorporated, 
nationality refers to the country of origin of the debt 
obligation. 
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while only US$0.425 billion were issued by 
nationals. This difference in the issuance of 
debt securities can be compared to Panama 
in which US$5.71 billion international debt 
securities were issued by resident 
institutions and US$5.06 billions were 
issued by nationals in 2000. 
Further, balance sheet activity of 
offshore banks in Caribbean islands 
predominantly comprises of interbank fund 
transactions, as opposed to the export or 
import of funds. For example, only 10% of 
the liabilities of U.S offshore branches in the 
Caribbean are non-bank related. As opposed 
to the OFC of Panama in which loans issued 
to the local sector by offshore banks are as 
high as 35% of OFC bank assets.  
The information stated above show 
the disjoint between offshore banking in the 
Caribbean and the local economy. This 
implies that offshore banking should not the 
business activity of local banks. 
Furthermore, Caribbean OFCs prohibits 
offshore banks from conducting business 
with residents, resident businesses, or local 
banks.
 4
 How then may offshore banking 
influence local finance?  
In all Caribbean islands most local 
banks are subsidiaries foreign banks. These 
include The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), 
RBTT (formally known as the Royal Bank 
of Trinidad and Tobago), First Caribbean 
International Bank, Citibank and Royal bank 
of Canada. Furthermore local banks in the 
Caribbean are conglomerates in which a 
holding company owns both a domestic and 
an offshore bank located in the same 
country, or other Caribbean Islands. For 
example, both BNS and First Caribbean 
International Bank have offshore on onshore 
affiliates in Barbados as well as The 
Bahamas. This structure of the financial 
                                                 
4See 
http://udel.edu/~leorey/Research/Caribbean%20Banking%
20Information.docx for some main aspects of offshore 
banking legislation in the Caribbean. 
sector in the Caribbean creates mechanisms 
by which the establishment of an offshore 
banking sector may impact the activity of 
local banks. The predominant of which are 
intra-bank activity done as a means to fund 
lending in other countries, and avoid 
domestic regulations, or both. In some 
instances this flow of funds between bank 
branches has created negative consequences.  
(Errico and Musalem 1999; and Williams et 
al., 2005) 
This study statistically evaluate 
whether local commercial banks of the 
Caribbean operate any differently in the 
presence of offshore banking. 
  
4. Theory and Data 
This study will move beyond 
analysis of market concentration ratios as 
the measure of industry competitiveness. 
Measures such as the asset share of the 
largest firms, interest rate spread, or 
profitability do not effectively reflect the 
degree of market competition as they may 
be influenced by government regulations, 
taxes, or other macroeconomic factors 
(Claessens and Laeven 2004). An estimation 
technique following that of Panzar and 
Rosse (1987), the P-R model, will be used to 
identify the extent of banking competition in 
the Caribbean.
5
    
 Empirical estimation of the P-R 
model returns a measure of market 
competition called the H-statistic, which 
describes the responsiveness of bank 
revenue to a percent change in its input 
prices.
6
 The sign and magnitude of the H-
statistic can be used to identify the degree of 
                                                 
5 I am implicitly assuming that banking in the Caribbean 
can be modeled as a regional single sector. This assumption 
can is validated given the fact that local banks in the region 
are all subsidiaries of the same parent banks, each having 
affiliates in other countries throughout the region. 
6 A number of studies have used the P-R model to 
empirically test the extent of banking competition 
(Mathews, Murinde, and Zhao 2007, Claessens and Laeven 
2003).  
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competition within the banking sector. An 
H-statistic equal to one reflects perfect 
competition in the banking sector. In the 
case of perfect competition, an increase in 
cost will leave equilibrium market output 
unchanged but will result in an equivalent 
increase in prices.
7
 Hence revenue will 
increase by the same amount, in the long 
run, as factor prices. A negative H-statistic 
demonstrates perfect collusion or a 
monopoly. Intuitively, increases in total cost 
and marginal cost curves will reduce output, 
and therefore decrease revenue as prices 
increase on the elastic portion of the demand 
curve.  
Annual balance sheet and income 
statements for all commercial banks were 
obtained for ten Caribbean countries, 
between 1993 and 2004. The countries 
included are Antigua & Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, and Trinidad & Tobago.
 8
 Seven of 
the ten countries house, or have adopted an 
offshore banking sector during the time 
period. The data does not include offshore 
banks located within the island. Table 1 lists 
the Caribbean islands that house offshore 
banking activity and the dates of enactment. 
The most direct impact of each enactment is 
the employment created, and government 
revenues generated from licensing and other 
fees.
9
  
Local banks in the traditional 
Caribbean offshore centers of The Bahamas 
and The Cayman Islands show very different 
business activities when compared to local 
banks in other Caribbean countries. The 
international banking component of local 
                                                 
7 This assumes a market demand curve with constant price 
elasticity. 
8 In the case of The Bahamas only the domestic side of the 
balance sheet is used in analysis due to the share size of its 
foreign assets and liabilities.  
9 Fee and licensing payments of international business 
companies in The Bahamas was at least $51 million in 
2000, about 1% of the value of GDP. 
commercial banking activity in The 
Bahamas and The Cayman Islands far 
exceed their domestic banking activity 
unlike local banks in other Caribbean 
countries. Domestic assets account for only 
4% of total assets in The Bahamas. Foreign 
bank assets due from head offices or 
branches outside The Bahamas totaled 
US$123,554 million, accounting for 90% of 
foreign assets. In 2002 liabilities due to head 
office and branches outside The Bahamas 
totaled US$115,869 million.   
Furthermore, some Class A Banks 
(local banks) in The Bahamas, such as First 
Caribbean International Bank, act as the 
home office for regional branches 
throughout the Caribbean. In addition, the 
foreign bank activity of Class A banks in 
The Bahamas goes beyond its business with 
its Caribbean affiliates. Foreign assets of 
local banks throughout the Caribbean sum to 
US$895 million in 2000, which fails in 
comparison to the US$56,235 million 
foreign liabilities of Bahamian local banks 
due to other head offices and branches in 
2000.  
Tables 2 and 3 give a snapshot of the 
balance sheet composition of local 
commercial banks in the region. The balance 
sheets show some evidence of differences in 
banking activity between local banks in 
Caribbean OFCs compared to those in non-
OFC Caribbean islands. International 
banking activity is a significant aspect of 
local commercial banking, and is larger for 
commercial banks located in Caribbean 
OFC islands.  
A further difference is observed in 
the loan portfolio of local banks. In the case 
of OFCs Antigua, The Cayman Islands, and 
The Bahamas domestic loans issued exceeds 
that of deposits received. In The Bahamas 
$3,721 million loans are issued domestically 
in 2000, while resident deposits are $3,369 
million, resulting in a loan to deposit ratio of 
110%. Similarly in the case of The Cayman 
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Islands, domestic loans issued were 25% 
greater than the value of resident deposits in 
1997. The Loan to deposit ratio of local 
commercial banks in the other Caribbean 
OFCs, with the exception of Barbados, is 
between 70% and 80%, compared to 50% in 
non-OFC Caribbean countries.  
 
                                                                    
 
 Table 1: Offshore Banking Enactment 
Country Statute Date 
The Bahamas Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 1965 
Bermuda  Tax Exemption Act 1966 
Barbados Offshore Bank Act 1979 
Turks and Caicos Companies Ordinance 1981 
Antigua  International Business Companies Act 1982 
The British Virgin Islands International Business Companies Act 1984 
Aruba  Exempt Company Act 1988 
The Cayman Islands Banks and Trust Companies Law 1995 
Dominica  Offshore Banking Act 1996 
St. Vincent  International Bank Act 1996 
St. Kitts The Financial Services Statutory Rules and Order 1997 
St. Lucia  International Bank Act 1999 
Grenada International Companies Act 2002 
This table lists the dates in which each Caribbean island enacted offshore banking legislation. There are 72 offshore 
financial centers (OFCs) listed by the IMF in 2000 of which 15 are Caribbean islands. The sample used for 
estimation includes seven of these 13 Caribbean OFCs.  
 
 
Table 2. Asset Composition of Local Commercial Banks in 2000 (% of total assets) 
  Total Loans 
Government 
Investments 
Cash and Central 
Bank Deposits 
Foreign  
Assets 
Local 
Securities 
Antigua 69 2 7 16 --- 
The Bahamas  79 8 4 --- 0.1 
Barbados 55 19 5 10 0.7 
Cayman Islands  84 --- 2 --- 0.5 
Dominica 72 6 7 11 --- 
Grenada 70 5 7 7 --- 
Jamaica 16 43 15 7 0.6 
St Kitts  63 5 6 13 --- 
St Lucia 80 3 6 3 --- 
St Vincent 66 7 9 5 --- 
Trinidad 40 8 10 5 --- 
The percentage of assets will not sum to 100 because balances with other banks, fixed assets, checks under collection, 
and other assets are not included in the table. In the case of Trinidad, fixed assets, other assets, and customer acceptances account 
for 25%. For The Bahamas and The Cayman Islands, the balance sheet asset composition represents the domestic balance sheet 
and excludes foreign business. Foreign banking activities of local banks of The Bahamas and The Cayman Islands far exceed 
their domestic banking activity, domestic assets account for only 4% of total assets in The Bahamas. Commercial banks in 
Eastern Caribbean countries held no local securities in 2000 as the domestic securities exchange for these countries was formed 
in 2001.  
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Table 3. Liability Composition of Local Commercial Banks in 2000 (% of Total Liabilities) 
  
Local 
Deposits 
Foreign 
Currency 
Deposits 
Balances due to 
Other Banks 
Foreign 
Liabilities 
Capital and 
Undistributed 
Profits 
Antigua 60.89 14.51 8.93 6.00 4.00 
The Bahamas  73.30 --- 0.70 --- 11.1 
Barbados 83.10 --- 0.90 4.50 2.70 
Cayman Islands(1997) 68.45 --- --- --- 24.7 
Dominica 80.23 1.84 6.52 0.37 7.00 
Grenada 81.48 6.61 0.30 2.50 4.00 
Jamaica 74.40 --- 5.70 0.50 7.30 
St Kitts  55.16 18.46 8.82 7.71 3.00 
St Lucia 83.46 0.55 3.07 3.17 4.60 
St Vincent 76.89 4.81 1.52 2.51 5.50 
Trinidad 56.20 --- 3.75 3.81 4.5 
Foreign liabilities are balances due to overseas banks. In the case of ECCU countries, balances due to other banks include the 
ECCB, other local banks, and other ECCB banks. Missing foreign currency deposits indicate that local deposit values include 
foreign currency deposits. 
 
 
The rest of the study will test for the 
degree of market competition and measure 
the relative efficiency of local banks. 
The variables used in empirical 
estimation will closely follow the work of 
Bikker et al. (2006), Claessens and Laeven 
(2004), and Mathews, Murinde and Zhao 
(2007). The log of interest revenue and total 
revenue are used as the dependent variables. 
Labor, physical capital, and financial capital 
are the input factors of bank production. The 
ratio of personal expenses to total assets, 
other operating and administrative expenses 
to total assets, and interest expenses to total 
deposits, are used to measure the prices of 
labor, physical capital, and financial capital 
respectively. The empirical estimation will 
control for other bank specific factors that 
influence revenues and costs. These factors 
include the extent of leveraging, measured 
as the value of equity to total assets, and 
credit risk, measured as the value of loans to 
total assets.
10
 Equity is calculated as bank 
                                                 
10 Research has included other controls such as the share of 
non-earning assets to total assets, to account for balance 
paid up capital plus retained earnings.
11
 The 
effect of the aggregate performance of the 
economy on bank revenue is captured by 
including the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. Bank size is proxied for by including 
total assets as an independent variable. All 
data are in logs. A country is classified as an 
OFC if it was included in the Financial 
Stability Forum’s Report of the Working 
Group on Offshore Centres (2000). An OFC 
is assigned a value if 1 one year after legal 
statues concerning offshore activity are 
enacted, and must have at least one offshore 
bank.
12
 
 
 
 
                                                                         
sheet composition, but such variables are excluded from 
estimation due to the lack of consistency in balance sheet 
reporting across countries. Other balance sheet activities 
are reported fairly consistently across countries. 
11 Equity for Jamaica is calculated as share capital plus 
retained earnings plus unappropriated profits. Which was 
negative in 1997. 
12 Grenada is not categorized as an OFC in the analysis 
since no offshore banks were incorporated during the 
sample period. 
7 
 
5.  Methodology and Results 
 The estimating equation is derived 
from equation (1) below. 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 +
                   𝛼𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (1) 
        
𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the measure of revenue of commercial 
banks located in country i at time t.  𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡  are 
the input prices, bank specific factors that 
influence cost and revenue curves is 
represented by 𝐷𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The measure of banking 
competition is  𝛽𝐾𝑘=1 𝑘  , the sum of 
coefficients on the input prices, and is 
referred to as the H-statistic. The approach 
identifies the responsiveness of revenue to 
input prices. An H-statistic between zero 
and one will demonstrate monopolistic 
competition within the market.  
The test for differences in the extent 
of banking competition among OFC islands 
is conducted by interacting the OFC variable 
with the H-statistic.
13
 The estimating 
equation then becomes 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 +
                   𝜃𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐹𝐶  
𝐾
𝑘=1 +
                    𝛼𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (2)  
 
The test hypothesis is 𝐻0 :  𝜃𝑘 = 0
𝐾
𝑘=1 , that 
is, the measure of banking competition 
among OFC islands is no different than in 
non-OFC islands. Table 4 below shows the 
estimation results.  
The coefficients are as expected, the 
H-statistic for both regression estimates are 
between 0 and 1, which is evidence of 
monopolistic market competition in the 
banking sector. This finding is consistent 
with that found in the literature. There is 
some measurable difference in the degree of 
market competition between local banks in 
                                                 
13
 The OFC dummy variable is time variant since 
some countries adopted offshore banking legislation 
during the sample period. 
OFC countries and non-OFC countries. The 
H-statistic for local commercial banks 
located in OFC islands is 0.592, compared 
to 0.631 in non-OFC islands.  These results 
indicate that local commercial banks in OFC 
islands, are operating in a less competitive 
manner when compared to local banks in 
non-OFC islands.   
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Table 4. Regression Estimates of Market Competition  
  Log Total Revenue   Log Interest Revenue 
Constant 0.804*** 0.840** 
 
0.747** 0.773*** 
  (2.90) (3.126) 
 
(2.57) (2.68) 
Log Labor Price 0.011 0.033 
 
0.014 0.034 
  (0.39) (0.50)  
(0.47) (0.51) 
Log Capital Price 0.097*** 0.069** 
 
0.069** 0.050* 
  (3.85) (2.34)  
(2.42) (1.66) 
Log Funds Price 0.493*** 0.528*** 
 
0.615*** 0.635*** 
  (13.37) (11.90)  
(16.81) (14.11) 
Log Labor Price*OFC  
0.000 
  
-0.006 
  
 
(0.00) 
  
(-0.10) 
Log Capital Price*OFC  0.127** 
  
0.093* 
  
 
(2.24) 
  
(1.61) 
Log Funds Price*OFC  
-0.166** 
  
-0.115* 
  
 
(-2.52) 
  
(-1.73) 
Log Credit Risk 0.308*** 0.334***  
0.315*** 0.335*** 
  (4.45) (4.80) 
 
(4.59) (4.76) 
Log Leverage 0.075** 0.065*  
0.090** 0.079** 
  (2.15) (1.75) 
 
(2.62) (2.13) 
Log Macroeconomy 0.048 0.058  
0.074 0.082 
  (0.39) (0.05) 
 
(0.61) (0.68) 
Log Size of Sector 
0.88*** 0.882*** 
 
0.882*** 0.881*** 
  (21.51) (20.02)  
(21.66) (19.74) 
R squared  0.994 0.994   0.994 0.994 
H-stat 0.602 0.631 
 
0.698 0.720 
H-Stat OFC 
 
0.592 
  
0.691 
p-value   0.05     0.16 
Table 4 displays the country specific fixed effects estimate of banking competition within the Caribbean. F-tests could not reject 
the hypothesis of no time specific fixed effect. The T-statistics of the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates =0 are reported 
in parenthesis. The degree of banking competition within non-OFC countries is given by the sum of the coefficient estimates on 
log labor price, log capital price and log funds. Log Labor Price*OFC is an interaction term such that the degree of banking 
competition between OFC countries is calculated as the degree of competition between non-OFC countries plus the sum of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms. P-values for the F-test of the hypothesis of whether there is a difference in the extent of 
market competition, (H-stat)-(H-stat OFC) = 0, is given at the end of the table.*** significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 
5% level, * significant at the 10% level, t-stat are in brackets. The revised version of this paper will account for the returned high 
R-squares in estimation. 
 
 
6. Data Envelopment Analysis 
Methodology, Data, and Results  
 
Data envelopment analysis will be 
used to test whether there is any difference 
in the extent of efficiency of operations for 
local commercial banks operating in OFC 
islands compared to those operating in non-
OFC islands. The analysis in the previous 
section demonstrated that bank revenue in 
OFC islands respond less to changes in 
factor prices than commercial banks in non-
OFC countries. This difference in the 
responsiveness to input price changes, may 
have implications for the efficiency under 
which banks conduct business.  
Banking sector efficiency will be 
estimated using data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). Introduced first by Farrel (1957), 
DEA is a non-parametric technique which 
makes no assumptions on the production 
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function or the distribution of variables, but 
does assume that all banks utilize the same 
technology and production function. 
Efficiency is defined as the ability to 
produce the maximum amount of output 
using a given level of inputs. Observed input 
and output decisions are used to calculate 
the efficiency of each banking sector. An 
integral part of DEA is the selection of the 
input and output variables. There are two 
main approaches in banking literature to 
describe the input and output decisions of 
banks, the “intermediary approach” and 
“production approach”. The intermediary 
approach describes the provision of credit as 
the main role of banks. Within this approach 
inputs are measured using the prices of the 
factors of bank production, labor, physical 
capital, and funds. The value of loans, 
deposits, and other earning assets are used as 
outputs (Maudos et al 2002). Within the 
framework of banks for production, 
otherwise known as the profit oriented 
approach, the primary role of banks is to 
borrow money from depositors in an effort 
to make loans and earn profit. Under the 
profit oriented approach inputs in bank 
production are measured as employee 
expenses, interest expenses, and total 
operating expenses. Output measures 
include total income, interest income, and 
non-interest income (Pasiouras et al. 2008 
and Yi-Hsing et al. 2007).  
The model employed is based on the 
work of Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 
(1978). Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (CCR) 
model a constant return to scale 
envelopment surface, in which efficiency is 
estimated in the absence of market prices. 
Shadow prices are used to apply weights to 
input and output decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
The model takes the form 
 
  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸0 =
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖0
                          (3)                                   
 
subject to the constraints 
 
 
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟
  𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑗
≤ 1,                       (4)                   
  𝑢 𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0                        (5)                                                                          
  𝑦𝑟𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗 > 0                      (6) 
                                  
Here, 𝑢𝑟  and 𝑣𝑖 , represent the 
shadow prices, which vary across firms. 
Shadow prices are restricted to be non-
negative, and are such that no sector’s 
efficiency is greater than one. The subscript 
0 represents the particular country being 
evaluated. Country, j, has a banking sector 
input vector xij (i= 1,2,…m) , and output 
vector yrj (r=1,2,..s). Within the CCR 
framework input and output choices are 
aggregated to form an efficiency measure.  
The model is transformed into the 
following optimization problem which is 
solved using the simplex method.  
                                      
Max𝑦0 = 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1                          (7)                                              
 
Subject to 
 
  𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖 𝑥𝑖0 = 1                                     (8)                                     
  𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗 −
𝑠
𝑟=1  𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 0                (9) 
 𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥  𝜀                           
 
Banks’ maximize the value of their 
output yr, given their constraints. Shadow 
prices are chosen so that constraint (9) 
holds, therefore the value of the objective 
function itself becomes the measure of 
efficiency. The results will establish a subset 
of countries that outline the envelopment 
surface (HCU), and identify the relative 
efficiency of the remaining countries. 
Estimates of technical efficiency is 
obtained using both the intermediary, and 
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production approaches to bank decisions. 
Balance sheet and income statements 
between 1993 and 2004 of domestic 
commercial banks in ten Caribbean islands 
are used to obtain the various input and 
output variables.
14
 
The variables based on the Output 
(revenue) Approach to banking activity are: 
 
Inputs 
1) Interest Expense: interest on deposits, and 
interest on loans from, the central bank, 
local banks, the head office and branches 
abroad, and other local financial institutions 
2) Non-Interest Expense: remuneration and 
training of employees, provision for 
depreciation, provisions for loan losses, 
contributions to pension funds, and other 
costs 
Outputs 
1) Interest Revenue: interest earned on 
loans, investments, and balances held at 
other local and foreign financial institutions 
2) Non-interest revenue: includes fees, 
commissions, service charges, gains on 
foreign exchange transactions, trading 
profits on securities, and other income 
 
The variables based on the 
Intermediary Approach to banking activity 
are: 
 
Inputs 
1) Price of Labor:  personal expenses as a 
share of total assets 
2) Price of Physical Capital:  other operating 
and administrative expenses as a share of 
total assets 
3) Price of Financial Capital:  interest 
expenses as a share of total deposits  
                                                 
14
 These countries are Antigua & Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & The 
Grenadines, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
Outputs 
1) Value of Loans: all loans and advances 
made within the year  
 
2) Other Earning Assets: government  
treasury bills and securities, foreign assets, 
and local private securities.  
 
An informal comparison of relative 
efficiency will be used to identify whether 
OFCs exhibit any difference in banking 
efficiency. Tables 5 and 6 below show the 
average efficiency scores based on the two 
approaches.  
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Table 5. Commercial Banks’ Average Efficiency Score based on the Intermediary Approach 
Year OFC Non-OFC 
Efficiency 
Difference 
(%) HCUs (OFC is bold) 
1993 0.865 0.931 -6.619 Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
1994 0.893 0.941 -4.800 Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
1995 0.945 0.948 -0.295 Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
1996 0.955 0.918 3.720 Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, St Kitts, St. Vincent, TT 
1997 0.947 1.000 -5.300 Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts, St. Lucia, TT 
1998 0.966 0.959 0.783 Antigua,  Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts, St. Lucia, TT 
1999 0.936 0.944 -0.790 Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts, St. Lucia 
2000 0.910 0.925 -1.576 Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts, St. Lucia 
2001 0.906 0.933 -2.657 Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
2002 0.919 0.944 -2.514 Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
2003 0.886 0.936 -5.048 Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
2004 0.877 0.911 -3.448 Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts 
 
 
Table 6. Commercial Banks’ Average Efficiency Score based on the Profit Oriented Approach 
 Year OFC Non-OFC 
Efficiency 
Difference 
(%) HCU (OFC is bold) 
1993 0.986 0.950 3.600 Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Vincent 
1994 0.950 0.967 -1.700 Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica 
1995 0.924 0.924 0.076 Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts 
1996 0.974 0.966 0.820 Bahamas, Barbados, St Kitts, St. Vincent ,TT 
1997 0.933 0.747 18.550 Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, St Kitts, TT 
1998 0.920 0.900 1.992 Bahamas, Barbados, St Kitts, TT 
1999 0.980 0.873 10.695 Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, St Kitts, TT 
2000 0.900 0.858 4.152 Bahamas, Barbados, St Kitts 
2001 0.887 0.942 -5.486 Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St Kitts, TT 
2002 0.877 0.956 -7.838 Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St Kitts, TT 
2003 0.923 0.993 -6.986 Bahamas, Jamaica, St Kitts 
2004 0.848 0.850 -0.124 Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St Kitts, TT 
TT represents Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
7. Results 
The most efficient countries (HCU) 
in any given year are listed in the right most 
column. These countries are given an 
efficiency score of one. The DEA analysis 
illustrates some interesting results. 
Characterizing banks as providing 
intermediary services as opposed to firms 
who seek pure revenue generation has 
different implications on performance. With 
regards to the profit oriented approach 
domestic banks in OFC countries are on 
average more efficient, and in fact the 
traditional OFCs of The Bahamas, and 
Barbados, are almost always among the 
most efficient countries. This is not the case 
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however when efficiency analysis is based 
on the intermediary role of banks. The 
average efficiency for non-OFCs is almost 
always larger than the average efficiency for 
OFC countries in each year, and furthermore 
the most efficient countries are non-OFC. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Offshore banking in the Caribbean is 
unlike that in most other offshore centers in 
that the establishment of the offshore 
financial center is not intended to have any 
impact on local finance. The paper analyzed 
whether local banks in Caribbean OFCs 
behaved any different than those in non-
OFC islands. 
 Econometric techniques are used to 
compare the competitive structure and the 
efficiency of banking activity. A measure of 
the competitive nature of the banking sector 
was estimated using the approach of Panzar 
and Rosse (1987). Unlike the results of Rose 
and Speigel (2006) we find that local banks 
located in offshore countries of the 
Caribbean act less competitively than those 
located in non-offshore countries. 
 Secondly, data envelopment analysis 
is used to estimate measures of efficiency of 
banking activity of local commercial banks. 
The estimated measures of efficiency of 
commercial banks located in OFC islands 
are then compared to the efficiency 
measures of commercial banks located in 
non-OFC islands. The DEA also showed a 
difference in domestic banking activity in 
OFC and non-OFC countries. Domestic 
banks located in OFC islands are less 
efficiently in their role as intermediaries but 
are more efficient in revenue generation. 
Further research should aim to 
identify the precise mechanisms by which 
these differences arise. 
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